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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARIE CLARK KNIGHTON, 
Plaintiff-Appella;nt, 
-vs.-
CALVIN K. KNIGHTON, 
Defendant-Responden-t. 
Case 
No. 9895 
RESPO,NDENT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent accepts appellant's STATEMENT OF 
THE KIND OF CASE, DISPOSITION IN LOWER 
COURT, AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL, as con-
tained on Pages 1 and 2 of Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts the statement of facts outlined 
by the Appellant with the following comments and addi-
tions thereto : 
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Upon the case being heard on its merits the 23rd day 
of October, 1962, and the resultant memorandum deci-
sion rendered on the 25th day of October, 1962 (R. 10-11) 
the court held : 
" ... that the defendant shall keep all payments 
current to the best of his ability, with the excep-
tion of house payments, which the plaintiff shall 
pay and that the plaintiff was entitled after the 
expiration of reasonable time to have the court 
further review the matter as to support and ali-
mony payments.'' (R.11) 
Respondent emphasizes the fact that under the terms 
of the Divorce decree the defendant was ordered to pay 
monthly, a total of $328.68, (R. 73) plus $36.05 for the 
DeSoto automobile, or a total of $364.73. The defendant 
testified at the trial on October 23, 1962, that his living 
expenses were $175.00 per month (R. 120) and that due 
to the nature of his work and the hours thereof a sub-
stantial portion of this amount was required for eating 
out, and that transportation costs were also high due to 
the present location of his residence in Bountiful and his 
place of employment in South Salt Lake, including travel 
to and from Holladay for visitation with his children 
(R. 119). 
In regard to paragraph 7 at the top of page 4 of 
Appellant's Brief, it should be noted that the gross fig-
ure of $2,422.84 was a combined record from Cottonwood 
Dairy for the amount earned during October, November, 
and December, 1962, and January and February, 1963. 
Defendant pointed out that if divided by 5 this would not 
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be representative of the monthly earnings for the balance 
of the year, as the months described included the three 
months of highest commission resulting from largest 
gross sales (R. 54). 
Defendant being financially unable to pay both the 
outstanding obligations and alimony and support, elected 
to give preference to payment of alimony and child sup-
port, thus demonstrating a preference for discharging his 
responsibility to his family rather than to his creditors 
(R. 58, 69). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THAT THE PETITION OF CALVIN K. 
KNIGHTON, DEFENDANT AND RESPOND-
ENT TO MODIFY THE DECREE OF DI-
VORCE ENTERED ON THE 20TH DAY OF 
NOVEMBER, 1962, DOES NOT FAIL TO 
STATE FACTS UPON WHICH RELIEF 
COULD BE GRANTED AND THE COURT 
DID NOT ERR IN ITS DISMISSING THE 
SAME. 
Encompassed in the framing of paragraph 5 of the 
petition to modify the decree, is the idea that the original 
decree was an economic impossibility and that the de-
fendant could not comply therewith. The provision in 
said memorandum decision (R. 11) that the alimony and 
support payment may be reviewed upon application of 
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plaintiff should be considered as reciprocal. If plaintiff 
had a right to call for a review, fairness and justice re-
quire that defendant have the same right. 
The justification for the review of the decree is em-
bodied in the fact that the decree on its face was inequi-
table, unconscionable and impossible of performance, and 
that defendant, after a bona fide effort of three or four 
months to comply with the decree, found it impossible to 
do so. 
The court below gave considerable weight to these 
factors and made a slight modification of the decree but 
only enough to make it possible for defendant to comply. 
In the case of Bailey v. Superior Court, 11 P. 2d 
285, the court stated, at page 868 : 
''The trial court entertaining the decree still re-
tains jurisdiction to modify its order if circum-
stances warrant the change, and the proper pro-
cedure for the party who is unable to comply with 
an order for the payment of alimony or support 
of minor children is to seek a modification of the 
order, not to resist its enforcement and thereby 
subject himself to contempt proceedings.'' 
The requirement that defendant pay $328.68 per 
month from total net earnings of from $37 4.00 to $380.00 
per month is on its face confiscatory, inequitable and 
unjust. 
A divorce suit is a suit in equity. (Dorsie v. Dorsie, 
122 P. 2d 64; Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, 193 P. 2d 391; 68 
Id. 275.) 
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Divorce proceedings are equitable proceedings and 
determination of the issues in each ease turns on its own 
facts. (Wood v. Wood, 76 Ariz. 412; 265 P. 2d 778.) 
It is not equitable to allow judgment either inter-
locutory or final to stand if it is confiscatory on its face 
and does not allow the defendant the bare necessities of 
life and the ability to maintain himself in his employ-
ment or so threatens his standing with his creditors as 
to imperil his employment. 
The appellant cites the case of Osmus v. Osmus, 
Gale v. Gale, Chaffee v. Chaffee, and Anderson v. Ander-
son, to establish the legal principal that a decree cannot 
be modified unless it is alleged, proven and the trial court 
finds that the circumstances upon which it was based have 
changed. In the Anderson case, however, the part quot-
ed from page 266 is a canvass or commentary given by 
the court to assist the litigants in that particular case 
under the set of facts with some guidance in any future 
litigation between the parties. It is submitted that the 
defendant herein making an honest effort to comply with 
the court's decision and finding from the real world of 
experience that such is impossible, should not in the 
spirit of equity be deprived of an early opportunity to 
seek redress in the original court which granted the 
decree. 
The Osmus ca.se is distinguished from the case at bar. 
In that case the court held that the defendant had no 
right to complain about the excessiveness of the alimony 
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because he had stipulated to the amount in the decree, ap-
parently without any intent to comply with it. The court 
said at page 237 : 
"He (the defendant) is hardly in a favorable po-
sition now to assert that the alimony awarded is 
excessive.'' 
No such stipulation was involved in the case at bar, 
and the only reason for defendant's delay in protesting 
was his desire to make an honest effort to comply. 
Points 2 and 3 will be discussed together. 
POINT 3 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A MODIFICATION OF THE DE-
CREE OF DIVORCE IN RELATION TO 
ALIMONY. 
POINT 2 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A MODIFICATION IN RELATION 
TO PAYMENT OF JOINT OBLIGATIONS BY 
DEFENDANT. 
Evidence at the trial and the hearing on the petition 
for modification demonstrated the unfeasibility of the de-
cree as it stood because it did not leave defendant the 
means of supporting himself and maintaining his em-
ployment. While the Findings of Fact stated defend-
ant's income to be between $400.00 and $484.50 per month, 
these figures represented defendant's gross income, his 
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net take-home pay being only $364.23 per month at the 
time of the last hearing ( R. 55', 56). The decree called 
for payments totaling $328.68. 
The original decree called for defendant to pay 87% 
of his monthly take-home pay for alimony, child support 
and payment of joint obligations. Even after the modi-
fication, defendant is required to pay 63% of his take-
home pay. 
A moderate reduction based upon these facts is not 
such an abuse of discretion by the court below as would 
warrant a reversal. 
The appellant contends that if there were dissatis-
faction with the decree an appeal was the proper remedy. 
However, this contention overlooks the inherent power 
of a court of equity to modify an inequitable decree, 
and thus accomplish an equitable result, or to correct 
its own errors. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we respectfully submit that there was 
no evidence brought forth at the trial of November 20, 
1962, or the hearing of March 4, 1963, that showed that 
the defendant had the ability to pay $225.00 per month 
support and alimony, plus $103.68 on joint obligations 
for a total of $328.68. 
The respondent honestly attempted to comply with 
said decree for a period of over three months in spite 
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of the obvious impossibility and, therefore, petitioned 
the court for relief as a matter of equity to overcome 
a decree manifestly unjust on its face. Regardless of 
any other issues involved, equity demands that this order 
of modification be affirmed and that the defendant he 
awarded a reasonable sum for the use and benefit of his 
attorneys in connection with the preparation and re-
sponse to this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BERNARD M. TANNER of 
BRADFORD, TANNER & FORBES 
202 Executive Building 
455 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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